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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Truman appeals from his conviction and sentence for lewd conduct with a 
minor under sixteen and sexual abuse of a minor following a jury trial. 
Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings 
A grand jury returned an indictment charging Truman with lewd conduct 
with a minor under sixteen and sexual abuse of a minor for acts committed 
against his 12 year old stepdaughter, T.S. (R., pp. 17-19.) Truman entered a 
plea of not guilty and the case was set for a jury trial. (R., pp. 28-29.) 
At trial, the prosecution presented evidence that Truman engaged in 
various forms of sexual misconduct with T.S., his stepdaughter. The sexual 
misconduct began when T.S. was 12 years old with Truman requesting that T.S. 
videotape himself and J.R., a family friend, engaged in sexual conduct. (Trial Tr., 
p. 267, L. 10 - p. 271, L. 17.) T.S. testified that she first performed oral sex on 
Truman later that evening. (Trial Tr., p. 272, Ls. 1-19.) She testified the abuse 
escalated over time - that Truman engaged in oral sex with her more and more 
frequently and that she would receive special favors when she complied with his 
requests and that he would withhold privileges when she refused. (Trial Tr., p. 
272, L. 20 - p. 278, L. 10.) The abuse stopped when T.S. reported it to members 
of her church when she was 15 years old. (Trial Tr., p. 250, L. 10 - p. 252, L. 
23.) 
Following the presentation of evidence and closing arguments, the case 
was submitted to the jury. The jury convicted Truman of both counts charged in 
1 
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the Information. (R, pp. 75-78; Trial Tr., p. 605, L. 13 - p. 606, L 10.) Truman 
was sentenced to thirty years with twenty years fixed on the lewd conduct 
charge. (R,. pp. 135-36, 141-42.) He was sentenced to fifteen years with ten 
years fixed on the sexual abuse of a minor charge, to run concurrently. (Id.) 
Truman timely appealed. (R, pp. 137-40.) 
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ISSUES ON APPEAL 
Truman states the issues on appeal as: 
1. Was there insufficient evidence to support Mr. Truman's conviction 
for sexual abuse of a minor? 
2. Did the district court lack jurisdiction over the subject matter of the 
charge of sexual abuse of a minor because the facts alleged in the 
indictment failed to allege a valid charge under the version of the statute 
that applies to Mr. Truman's case? 
3. Did the district court err when it admitted prior bad acts evidence 
against Mr. Truman? 
4. Did the prosecutor commit misconduct when the prosecutor elicited 
testimony in violation of the district court's order that deemed testimony 
regarding J.R.'s mental condition inadmissible because it was irrelevant? 
5. Did the cumulative effect of the trial errors in this case deprive Mr. 
Truman of his constitutional right to a fair trial? 
(Appellant's brief, p. 11.) 
The state rephrases the issues as: 
1. The state concedes that the facts alleged in the indictment fail to support 
the charge of sexual abuse of a minor and that Truman's sexual abuse-of a minor 
conviction should be vacated. 
2. Has Truman failed to show that the district court erred when it admitted 
prior bad acts evidence against Truman? 
3. Has Truman failed to show that the prosecutor committed misconduct 
when it introduced testimony concerning J.R.'s mental condition? 
4. Has Truman failed to show error, let alone cumulative error, which would 
warrant a new trial? 
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The State Concedes That The Facts Alleged In The Indictment Fail To Support 
The Charge Of Sexual Abuse Of A Minor And That Truman's Sexual Abuse Of A 
Minor Conviction Should Be Vacated 
A. Introduction 
Truman was charged with sexual abuse of a minor based on the fact that 
he requested T.S. to videotape him engaging in sexual acts with J.R., a third 
party. Under the version of the statute in effect at that time, a solicitation 
conviction under the statute required proof that the defendant communicated a 
desire for the minor child to participate in the sexual act. Here, Truman did not 
ask T.S. to participate in the act but rather to videotape the act. As a result, there 
was insufficient evidence to support the charge and the charge was insufficient 
as a matter of law. 
B. The Facts Alleged In The Indictment Fail To Support The Charge Of 
Sexual Abuse Of A Minor And Truman's Sexual Abuse Of A Minor 
Conviction Should Be Vacated 
Truman was charged with sexual abuse of a minor, in violation of I.C. § 
18-1506, based on the fact that he requested T.S. to videotape himself engaged 
in a sexual act with J.R. at some point between August 2006 and December 
2006. (R., p. 18.) At that time, the statute read, in relevant part: 
(1) It is a felony for any person eighteen (18) years or older, with 
the intent to gratify the lust, passions or sexual desire of the actor, 
minor child, or third party, to: 
(a) solicit a minor child under the age of sixteen (16) years 
to participate in a sexual act... 
(2) For purposes of this section "solicit" means any written, verbal, 
or physical act which is intended to communicate to such minor 
child the desire of the actor or third party to participate in a sexual 
act or participate in sexual foreplay, by the means of sexual 
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contact, photographing or observing such minor child engaged in 
sexual contact. 
I.C. § 18-1506. 
Under this statutory scheme, a conviction for sexual abuse by solicitation 
required proof that the defendant requested that the minor participate directly in 
the sexual contact.1 See Minturn v. State, 144 Idaho 656, 664, 168 P.3d 40, 48 
(Ct. App. 2007). Thus, merely requesting a child to videotape or photograph 
another engaged in sexual contact but not actually asking the child to participate 
in the sexual act was insufficient to support the charge. & For this reason, the 
state concedes that the evidence presented at Truman's trial was insufficient to 
support the sexual abuse of a minor charge. Truman's conviction for sexual 
abuse of a child should therefore be vacated. 
II 
Truman Has Failed To Show That The District Court Abused Its Discretion When 
It Admitted Prior Bad Acts Evidence Against Him 
A. Introduction 
Truman asserts that the district court abused its discretion when: it 
admitted uncharged misconduct evidence, arguing the decision of the district 
court was based upon an erroneous understanding of the law regarding I.R.E. 
404(b) evidence standards in child sex cases. (Appellant's brief, p. 19.) The 
district court ruled, after hearing argument from both the state and the defense, 
that "evidence of prior sexual contacts between Defendant and the victim and the 
1 Idaho Code § 18-1506 has subsequently been amended to include Truman's 
conduct. It now provides that it constitutes sexual abuse of a child to "induce, 
cause or permit a minor child to witness an act of sexual conduct." 
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disclosure of dates as best as can be ascertained starting with the disclosure of 
Defendant asking the victim about a sexual act and then the future acts of 
solicitation between August and December, 2006, and further acts of sexual 
contact during 2007, ending in December, 2007" was admissible. (R,. p. 71.) 
Truman asserts that this ruling was error. However, Truman's argument 
fails for several reasons. As an initial matter, Truman's assertion that the district 
court necessarily abused its discretion because it failed to anticipate a chance in 
the law is without merit. In addition, Truman failed to adequately cite to the 
transcript and it is unknown what evidence was purportedly admitted in 
contravention of I.R.E. 404(b). Further, a careful review of the transcript of the 
404(b) hearing shows that Truman acquiesced to the use of 404(b) evidence at 
trial. Thus, Truman is precluded under the invited error doctrine from asserting 
that the admission of the evidence was error. Even if Truman did not acquiesce 
to the introduction of this evidence, this evidence was properly admitted to show 
the res gestae of the crime and to show a common scheme or plan. Finally, 
even if the admittance of this unknown evidence was error, such error was 
harmless. For these reasons, Truman has failed to show that the district court 
erred in admitting this evidence. 
B. Standard of Review 
Rulings under I.R.E. 404(b) are reviewed under a bifurcated standard: 
whether the evidence is admissible for a purpose other than propensity is given 
free review while the determination of whether the probative value of the 
evidence is substantially outweighed by its potential for unfair prejudice is 
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reviewed for an abuse of discretion. State v. Grist, 147 Idaho 49, 51, 205 P.3d 
1185, 1187 (2009). 
C. Truman Has Failed To Show That The District Court Erred In Admitting 
Evidence Of Truman's Other Sexual Acts With T.S. 
Evidence of other crimes, wrongs or acts is not admissible to prove the 
character of the defendant in an attempt to show he or she committed the crime 
for which he or she is on trial. State v. Grist, 147 Idaho 49, 52, 205 P.3d 1185, 
1188 (2009). However, such evidence is admissible for other purposes, 
including proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, 
identity, or absence of mistake or accident. I.R.E. 404(b); State v. Phillips, 123 
Idaho 178, 845 P.2d 1211 (1993); State v. Gauna, 117 Idaho 83,87,785 P.2d 
647, 651 (Ct. App. 1989). Evidence of prior bad acts is admissible if (a) it is 
relevant to prove some issue other than the defendant's character, and (b) its 
probative value for the proper purpose is not substantially outweighed by the 
probability of unfair prejudice. State v. Cross, 132 Idaho 667,670,978 P.2d 227, 
230 (1999). The second prong of this test only excludes evidence if the danger 
of unfair prejudice substantially outweighs its probative value. State v. Sheahan, 
139 Idaho 267,275-76,77 P.3d 956, 964-65 (2003). 
1. Truman's Argument That The District Court Necessarily Abused Its 
Discretion Because It Failed To Anticipate A Change In The Law Is 
Without Merit 
Truman argues that because the district court failed to anticipate the 
changes to the law as stated in State v. Grist, 147 Idaho 49,205 P.3d 1185 
(2009), its ruling was "predicated on an erroneous understanding of the law 
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regarding I.R.E. 404(b) evidence standards in child sex cases," and therefore the 
ruling was, as a matter of law, "fatally flawed from the outset" and erroneous. 
(Appellant's brief, pp. 19-22.) Truman's argument that all pre-Grist evidentiary 
rulings in child sex crime cases are ipso facto abuses of discretion is contrary to 
applicable legal standards for appellate review. 
, 
The three elements of discretionary review are "whether: (1) the trial court 
correctly perceived the issue as discretionary; (2) the trial court acted within the 
outer bounds of its discretion and with applicable legal standards; and (3) the trial 
court reached its decision through an exercise of reason." Grist, 147 Idaho at 51, 
205 P.3d at 1187 (emphasis added) (citing Sun Valley Shopping Ctr., Inc. v. 
Idaho Power Co., 119 Idaho 87, 94, 803 P.2d 993, 1000 (1991 )). The applicable 
standard is thus not whether the court correctly articulated a certain legal 
standard, but whether it acted consistently with those standards. Unlike argued 
by Truman, the question here is whether the district court acted consistently with 
applicable legal standards. 
Likewise, Truman's argument fails because there is no reason to believe 
that the district court misperceived the discretionary part of its inquiry. Grist did 
not change the balancing test, the only discretionary part of the I.R.E. 404(b) 
inquiry. See Grist, 147 Idaho at 52, 205 P.3d at 1188 ("This balancing is 
committed to the discretion of the trial judge."). Grist changed the law on the 
relevancy portion of the inquiry, Grist, 147 Idaho at 53-55, 205 P .3d at 1189-91, a 
matter reviewed de novo. State v. Sheldon, 145 Idaho 225,230,178 P.3d 28, 33 
(2008); State v. Williams, 134 Idaho 590, 592, 6 P.3d 840, 842 (Ct. App. 2000). 
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Truman's claim that this Court should merely conclude that the district court erred 
because the applicable case law has since modified the applicable legal standard 
is unsupported by law. 
2. Truman's Claim Of Error Has Been Waived Because He Failed To 
Cite To The Record 
On appeal, Truman asserts that the "district court erred in admitting I.RE. 
404(b) evidence against him because the district court's determination was 
predicated on an erroneous understanding that there were relaxed standards of 
admissibility for this evidence in cases where the defendant is charged with a 
sexual offense against a minor." (Appellant's brief, p. 18.) Truman, however, 
fails to cite to the transcript in support of his argument and, because there was 
no objection at trial, it is unknown what evidence Truman deems improperly 
admitted. Truman's assertion of error in the admittance of "all of the State's 
allegations of uncharged prior bad acts" (Appellant's brief, p. 19) is wholly 
inadequate to satisfy the requirements of Idaho Appellate Rule 35(a)(6). This 
rule reads: "The argument shall contain the contentions of the appellant with 
respect to the issues on appeal, the reasons therefore, with citations to the 
authorities, statutes and parts of the transcript and record relied upon." 
(emphasis added). See also, State v. Creech, 132 Idaho 1, 20, 966 P.2d 1,20 
(1998); State v. Zichko, 129 Idaho 259, 263, 923 P.2d 966, 970 (1996). Because 
it is unknown what evidence Truman considers improperly admitted I.R.E. 404(b) 
evidence, the state is unable to adequately respond to this assertion. As a result, 
the issue should not be considered on appeal. 
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3. If This Court Deems That Truman Has Not Waived This Issue, 
Truman Is Precluded By The Doctrine Of Invited Error From 
Asserting That The District Court Erred In Admitting Uncharged 
Misconduct Evidence When He Agreed To Admission Of The 
Evidence 
The doctrine of invited error estops a party from asserting an error when 
his own conduct induced the commission of the error. State v. Atkinson, 124 
Idaho 816, 819, 864 P.2d 654, 657 (Ct. App. 1993). A party may not complain of 
errors he has consented to or acquiesced in. State v. Caudhill, 109 Idaho 222, 
226,706 P.2d 456,460 (1985). 
Under the doctrine of invited error, Truman is precluded from claiming that 
the district court improperly admitted I.R.E. 404(b) evidence against him. The 
state believes that Truman is objecting to uncharged misconduct evidence that 
was included in a CARES report that was discussed at a pre-trial hearing. (See 
generally 9/8/08 Tr., p. 14, L. 4 - p. 52, L. 15.) Although Truman neglects to 
mention it in his brief, at the pre-trial hearing Truman's attorney specifically 
agreed to the admission of this uncharged misconduct evidence and, as a result, 
under the doctrine of invited error, the evidence was properly admitted. 
Specifically, at the 404(b) hearing Truman's attomey stated: 
Just real brief. Judge, I have no problem if this lady 
wants to come in here and say I had this incident started when 
I was 11 years old, number one, when I was 11 years old. And 
that was in 2004, according to my calculation. I might be off a year 
or two. Maybe a year. It happened in 2004. And this is what Mr. 
Truman did to me. He came to my room and did this. 
Then three or four years later, in 2007, when I was 14 years 
old, then this is what happened. This is what he did. Then she 
can give us the laundry list of what Mr. Truman supposedly 
did. If that's what we have, that's fine. 
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(9/8/08 Tr., p. 19, L. 17 - p. 20, L. 4 (emphasis added).) The prosecutor then 
explained that he couldn't pin the victim to specific dates but that the victim could 
give her age and approximates dates or times of the year. (9/8/08 Tr., p. 20, Ls. 
23 - p. 22, L. 7.) Truman's attorney agreed: 
Judge, I do agree with that. And just for the state's 
benefit, I'm not talking about this lady has to remember the 
month, the day. All I'm saying is she said when I was 11 years 
old, which was, according to my calculation 2004, some incident 
. happened. Then nothing transpired after that until 2007. 
I'm not asking that she come in here and recall 
specifically the month and the day. All I'm saying is that's three 
years' gap in between. If that is. the case, I'm fine with that. 80 as 
opposed to saying, well, we have one incident in 2004 when I was 
11 years old. Oh, by the way, another incident happened six 
months later in maybe 2005. Then maybe three more incidents 
happened in 2006, or five more incidents happened in 2006. That's 
what I'm trying to guard against 
I agree with the state. I'm not asking that she give me a 
particular day, a particular month. All I'm saying is we have 
two instances. One in 2004 when she was 11. There may be a 
series of offenses in 2007; I will go as far as saying that. 
r.1aybe that's the allegation. And I'm not asking that she give 
me specific days and months regarding that. I just wanted 
recognition regarding the time frame in between the first approach 
and the allegation in this case. That's what I'm asking. 
(9/8/08 Tr., p. 22, L. 8 - p. 23, L. 11 (emphasis added).) The prosecutor and 
court discussed the time-frame to which T.8. would testify, which included sexual 
contact during the "six months or eight months" prior to December 7, 2007 
(8/9/08 Tr., p. 23, L. 14 - p. 26, L. 22), and the following colloquy ensued: 
The Court: Okay, 80 what you just presented to me, you - are 
you objecting to any portion of what he just said, Mr. 
Omanubosi, as far as evidence? 
Mr. Onanubosi: What the state or-
11 
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The Court: Yea, the state just said. He just described sort of the 
time frame as to what she's going to testify - they're 
requesting her to testify to previous events. 
Mr.Onanubosi: Okay. As it relates to count-one, which is the 
5th day of December, 2007, as to - I'm talking about 
the indictment itself. 
The Court: Yeah. 
Mr. Onanubosi: That these particular acts took place. I'm 
not going to take object to that. Of course she 
can testify to that. So that was December - that 
was December, 2007. 
As it relates to a series of events that 
supposedly took place between August 2006 and 
December 2006, the allegation says that those are 
the time that my client supposedly solicited the older 
girl to engage in videotaping of a sexual act between 
himself and the stepdaughter. 
If this lady is going to come and say, well, 
during those months, between December 2006 
and - August 2006 and December 2006, a series 
of solicitations took place, I think she can testify 
to that. I think she can testify to that. 
(9/8/08 Tr., p. 26, L. 23 - p. 27, L. 25 (emphasis added).) Based on the 
foregOing, it is apparent that Truman's attomey specifically approved of T.S. 
giving a "laundry list" of what happened in the last six to eight months of 2007 
and further agreed to T.S. explaining a series of events in 2006. 
At trial, T.S. testified consistently with what the parties discussed at the 
September 8, 2008 hearing. T.S. testified about the first time that Truman 
approached her when she was 12 years old. (Trial Tr., p. 266, L. 12 - p. 267, L. 
9.) She explained that he came into her bedroom and told her that if she was 
ever curious about anything or ever wanted to try anything that he was there to 
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help. (Trial Tr., p. 267, Ls. 2-7.) She explained that "he's basically there for me 
to experiment with." (Trial Tr., p. 267, L. 7.) Truman previously agreed to 
admission of this testimony. (See 9/S/0S Tr., p. 19, L. 16-20; p. 20, Ls. 15-20.) 
T.S. also testified about the time that Truman asked her to videotape 
himself and J.R. having oral sex. (Trial Tr., p. 267, L. 10 - p. 271, L. 15.) Again, 
as this testimony addresses Count II of the Information, it is squarely within the 
scope of admissible testimony. Truman also affirmatively agreed to this 
testimony as one of a "series of solicitations" that took place between August 
2006 and December 2006. (See 9/S/0S Tr., p. 27, Ls. 21-25.) 
T.S. explained how the evening after the videotape incident, Truman 
approached her and J.R. in her bedroom and that she performed oral sex on 
Truman for the first time that evening. (Trial Tr., p. 271, L. is - p. 272, L. 19.) 
She also explained that this only occurred occasionally in the beginning but 
became more and more frequent over time. (Trial Tr., p. 272, L. 20 - p. 273, L. 
is.) Again, Truman previously agreed to this testimony. (See 9/S/0S Tr., p. 22 , 
L. S - p. 23, L. 11; p. 26, L. 23 - p. 27, L. 25.) 
She further testified about an incident that occurred when she and Truman 
were four-wheeling in the mountains (Trial Tr., p. 274, L. 19 - 276, L. 24), and 
about how she would receive special favors from Truman when she acquiesced 
to his demands, and how he would withhold privileges when she refused to 
participate (Trial Tr., p. 276, L. 25 - p. 27S, L. 10). This testimony also falls 
within Truman's agreement that T.S. could testify about the "laundry list of what 
Mr. Truman supposedly did." (See 9/S/0S Tr., p. 20, Ls. 2-4.) 
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Finally, T.S. testified that Truman had also touched her "breasts and butt," 
that her mind would detach and she wouldn't think about what she was doing 
while she was performing oral sex on Truman, and that he had used a vibrator 
and sex creams with her. (Trial Tr., p. 281, L. 16 - p. 285, L. 25.) Again, this 
testimony falls within the "laundry list" of testimony to which Truman previously 
agreed. 
Under the doctrine of invited error, Truman cannot now complain about 
the admission of evidence to which he previously acquiesced. Although it is 
unknown what specific evidence Truman .objects to, the entirety of T.S.'s 
testimony fell within the range of evidence to which he had previously agreed. 
The doctrine of invited error precludes Truman from raising this issue on appeal. 
4. To The Extent That Truman Did Not Invite The Admission Of The 
404(b) Evidence, Such Evidence Was Properly Admitted By The 
District Court As The Res Gestae Of The Crime And To Show A 
Common Scheme Or Plan 
To the extent that Truman did not invite the admission of the 404(b) 
evidence, such evidence falls squarely within the pUNiew of 404(b) and the 
district court correctly admitted it. Truman, relying primarily on State v. Grist, 147 
Idaho 49, 205 P.3d 1185 (2009), asserts that this evidence was relevant only to 
show propensity. A closer review of Grist, however, shows that it does not forbid 
the admission of the prior acts committed against T.S. 
The Court in Grist discussed admission of evidence under I.R.E. 404(b) to 
corroborate a victim and to show a common scheme or plan. It did not state that 
evidence of prior bad acts is inadmissible for this purpose, but emphasized that if 
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the only relevance of the evidence was that it tended to show that because the 
defendant did it before he probably did it again it was not properly considered 
evidence of either corroboration or a common scheme or plan. Grist, 147 Idaho 
at 54, 205 P.3d at 1190 ("The unstated premise in Moore is simply this: 'If he did 
it before, he probably did it this time as well.' This complete reliance upon 
propensity is not a permissible basis for the admission of evidence of uncharged 
misconduct.") The Court went on, however, to point out that prior bad act 
evidence can be admissible to corroborate or show a common plan or scheme. 
Id. at 54-55, 205 P.3d at 1190-91. The Court cautioned that district courts 
should scrutinize whether evidence offered to show corroboration or common 
scheme or plan "actually serves the articulated purpose or whether such 
evidence is merely propensity evidence served up under a different name." .!Q, at 
55,205 P.3d at 1191. 
Here the evidence is admissible for purposes other than mere propensity. 
Truman's prior sexual acts with T.S. were relevant and admissible because they 
tended to show the res gestae of the crime and his intent, preparation, and plan 
to engage in inappropriate sexual activity with T.S. State v. Blackstead, 126 
Idaho 14,878 P.2d 188 (Ct. App. 1994), is instructive on this point. 
In Blackstead, the defendant hired RS., the fifteen-year-old daughter of a 
family friend, to help him paint. 126 Idaho at 16, 878 P.2d at 190. At some point 
when RS. was at Blackstead's house, he offered her marijuana, which she 
accepted, gave her "peanut butter crank," and, while RS. was under the 
influence of these drugs, Blackstead had intercourse with her. Id. Afterwards, 
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Blackstead drove R.S. home and "gave her forty dollars and a bag of marijuana." 
.!Q., "[S]everal days after this first sexual encounter, Blackstead arrived at R.S.'s" 
and "allegedly provided drugs, including crank, which he and [R.S.] used." .!Q., 
Blackstead then asked R.S. "if she could 'slip away for awhile.'" .!Q., R.S. 
declined and Blackstead left. .!Q., 
On appeal, Blackstead argued that the district court erred in admitting 
evidence of the drug use, claiming such evidence was improper under I.R.E. 
404(b). Blackstead, 126 Idaho at 17-19, 878 P.2d at 191-193. The Court of 
Appeals found the first incident of drug use admissible as part of the res gestae 
of the alleged sexual offense . .!Q., at 18-, 878 P.2d at 192. The court explained, 
"In this context, res gestae refers to other acts that occur during the commission 
of or in close temporal proximity to the charged offense which must be described 
to complete the story of the crime on trial by placing it in the context of nearby 
and nearly contemporaneous happenings." .!Q., (intemal quotes omitted). It 
continued: 
The state is entitled to present a full and accurate account of 
the circumstances of the commission of the crime, and if such an 
account also implicates the defendant or defendants in the 
commission of other crimes for which they have not been charged, 
the evidence is nevertheless admissible. The jury is entitled to 
base its decision upon a full and accurate description of the events 
conceming the whole criminal act, regardless of whether such 
description also implicates a defendant in other criminal acts . 
.!Q., (citing State v. Izatt, 96 Idaho 667, 670, 534 P.2d 1107, 1110 (1975)). The 
court concluded that "disclosure of the drug use was necessary ... to give the 
jury a full explanation of how the sexual contact came about." .!Q., 
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With respect to the second incident, the Court of Appeals concluded that 
although it was not part of the res gestae of the first sexual offense or an offense 
that was alleged to have occurred three to four weeks later, such evidence was 
relevant and admissible. Blackstead, 126 Idaho at 19, 878 P.2d at 193. The 
Court explained: 
[T]he district court also stated that this evidence .was relevant to 
Blackstead's process of grooming R.S. for sexual exploitation. This 
presents an independent rationale for relevance which we must 
examine. From the record it is apparent that the state sought to 
show that Blackstead used drugs as a method of seducing or 
lowering the resistance of the victim and rewarding her for 
submission to his sexual demands. It must be remembered that 
although Blackstead was convicted for only the first alleged offense 
... , the state had charged and at trial presented evidence of a 
second molestation several weeks later. That occasion when 
Blackstead allegedly gave drugs to RS. and E.M. and asked RS. 
to "slip away" preceded the second charged sexual offense. We 
conclude that evidence of this intervening meeting and drug use 
with RS. and E.M. was probative of a continuing criminal design by 
Blackstead to cultivate a relationship with RS., induce her 
submission to his sexual demands and procure her silence through 
use of drugs - a process which the district court referred to as 
"grooming." 
The Court further noted that "[p]roof of a plan to commit the charged crime 
is a purpose authorized by !.RE. 404(b) for introduction of other crimes 
evidence," and, as such, "in cases where uncharged criminal acts of the 
de(endant were in furtherance of an underlying plan to commit the charged 
crime, those acts are, ... admissible to show the accomplishment of the criminal 
goal." kL see also State v. Tapia, 127 Idaho 249, 255, 899 P.2d 959, 965 (Ct. 
App. 1995) (concluding evidence of defendant's statements regarding his 
"interest" in minor victim, "whether viewed as evidence of uncharged misconduct 
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or not, were highly probative" because "[t]hey were evidence of Tapia's scheme 
or plan to subject a particular eleven year old girl to sexual acts ... , [and] [t]hey 
showed the preparations undertaken by Tapia to put his plan into action and his 
intent to gratify his sexual desire for this adolescent girl"). 
Like in Blackstead, Truman's prior sexual acts with T.S. are evidence of 
the res gestae of the crime and "present a full and accurate account of the 
circumstances of the commission of the crime." Testimony concerning Truman's 
prior sexual acts with T.S. are inseparably connected to the chain of events 
leading to the current charges against Truman. This testimony was necessary to 
explain how Truman's conduct against T.S. developed over time and how T.S. 
finally decided to report the charged incident. 
Further, Truman's attempts to engage T.S. in sexual discussions and 
conduct with him are evidence of grooming T.S. for sexual exploitation. 
Truman's conversations with T.S., his solicitations of T.S., and his rewarding T.S. 
for acquiescing to his demands show Truman's intent to lower her resistance to 
his sexual demands. This evidence was clearly relevant to show Truman's plan, 
intent, and motive. 
The relevance of evidence of prior bad acts is given free review. Johnson, 
2010 WL 337993, *2. All of the evidence of prior incidents are relevant to the res 
gestae of the crime and to Truman's plan, sexual intent, and motive. As such, 
the evidence is relevant and admissible. Further, while the evidence may also be 
prejudicial, it is not unfairly so. Truman has failed to establish the district court 
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abused its discretion in concluding its probative value was not substantially 
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. 
D. Truman Has Failed To Show That The District Court Erred In Admitting 
Evidence Of Truman's Sexual Acts With J.R. 
Truman asserts that the admission of uncharged evidence regarding 
allegations of sexual contact between himself and J.R. was error because those 
acts were only relevant to an invalid charge. (Appellant's brief, pp. 22-23.) 
However, despite his ability to do so, Truman failed to object to the charge of 
sexual abuse of a minor at trial and failed to object to evidence supporting that 
charge at trial. It is well settled that the failure to raise an issue before the trial 
court generally waives that issue for purposes of appeal. State v. McAway, 127 
Idaho 54, 60,896 P.2d 962, 968 (1995); State v. Lavy, 121 Idaho 842,844,828 
P.2d 871, 873 (1992); State v. Beard, 135 Idaho 641,645-46,22 P.3d 116, 120-
21 (Ct. App. 2001). Although an exception to this bedrock principle of appellate 
revievv exists if the alleged error constitutes fundamental error, Truman cannot 
successfully argue the existence of fundamental error in this case. As held by 
the Idaho Supreme Court, the allegedly erroneous admission of I.R.E. 404(b) 
evidence "is a trial error and does not go to the foundation of the case or take 
from the defendant a right which was essential to his defense." State v. 
Cannady, 137 Idaho 67,72-73,44 P.3d 1122, 1127-28 (2002) (citing McAway, 
127 Idaho 54, 896 P.2d 962); State v. Johnson, 126 Idaho 892, 894 P.2d 125 
(1995); State v. Bingham, 116 Idaho 415, 776 P.2d 424 (1989)). The admission 
of such evidence does not constitute fundamental error which can be reviewed 
on appeal even though no objection was made below. J.9.,. Thus, Truman's claim 
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of error is not appropriate for appellate review, and this court must decline to 
consider it. 
Further, even assuming that this court considers Truman's assertion of 
error! the uncharged misconduct was relevant to and the district court did not 
abuse its discretion in admitting the acts as corroborative evidence of the lewd 
conduct charge. On direct examination, after several introductory questions to 
establish J.R.'s ability to tell the truth from a lie, her familiarity with Truman and 
his family, the layout of Truman's house, and J.R.'s euphemisms for various body 
parts (Trial Tr., p. 199, L. 11 - p. 205, L. 21), the entire extent of J.R.'s testimony 
on direct examination about the facts of this case consisted of the following: 
Q. [J.R.], have you ever seen Jeff's thing? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Was there ever a time when you and rr.S.] and Jeff were together 
that you saw his thing? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Was there anything - do you remember if the TV was on one of 
those times where the TV had something on it? 
A. Sometimes. 
Q. And what kind of things would be on that? 
A. People naked 
Q. Okay. And during any of those times when you saw Jeff's thing 
was there anything that you and [T.S.] and Jeff did during that 
time? 
A. I don't understand. 
Q. Okay. Did you ever touch Jeff's thing? 
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A. Yes. 
Q. Was [T.S.] there when that happened? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Did Jeff's thing - would anything - did you put Jeffs thing 
anywhere in your body or on your body? 
A. In my mouth and on my chest. 
Q. Okay. And you say our -
A. Mine and [T.S]'s. 
Q. Yours and [T.S]'s, okay. 
(Trial Tr., p. 205, L. 21 - p. 206, L. 22.) 
As an initial matter, this testimony was clearly relevant to both charges 
against Truman. This evidence is clearly admissible in the sexual abuse charge, 
and an acquittal on appeal does not retroactively make its admission erroneous. 
See,~, Blackstead, 126 Idaho at 19, 878 P.2d at 193 (acquittal did not change 
analysis of admissibility). Likewise, for admission on the lewd conduct charge, 
the district court must determine "whether the fact of another crime or wrong, if 
established, would be relevant. Evidence of uncharged misconduct must be 
relevant to a material and disputed issue concerning the crime charged, other 
than propensity." Grist, 147 Idaho at 52,205 P.3d at 1188 (internal quotes and 
citations omitted). Here, J.R.'s testimony was relevant to a material and disputed 
issue on the lewd conduct count: whether or not T.S. fabricated her allegations 
of abuse. Throughout the pre-trial proceedings and trial, Truman consistently 
insinuated that T.S. was lying and that she fabricated the allegations, placing 
T.S.'s credibility squarely at issue. (See, generally. Trial Tr., p. 188, L. 6 - p. 
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189, L. 7; p. 223, L. 16 - p. 224, L. 7; p. 313, L. 15 - p. 314, L. 15; p. 317, L. 24-
p. 321, L. 21; p. 555, L. 24 - p. 589, L. 9.) Thus, J.R's testimony was directly 
relevant to support and corroborate the lewd conduct charge by Truman against 
T.S. 
The word "corroborate" was defined in Grist as: 
To strengthen; to add weight or credibility to a thing by additional 
and confirming facts or evidence. The testimony of a witness is 
said to be corroborated when it is shown to correspond with the 
representation of some other witnesses, or to comport with some 
facts otherwise known or established. BLACKS LAW 
DICTIONARY, 311 (5th ed. 1979). 
Grist, 147 Idaho at 54,205 P.3d at 1190. Here, J.R's testimony corroborates 
T.S.'s testimony. J.R only testified about instances of sexual conduct that 
occurred with Truman when T.S. was present. Given Truman's defense that J.R. 
was fabricating the allegations against him, J.R.'s testimony adds "weight or 
credibility" to T.S.'s testimony "by additional and confirming facts or evidence." 
After determining that the 404(b) evidence is relevant, the court must 
engage in a balancing under I.RE. 403 and determine whether the danger of 
unfair prejudice substantially outweighs the probative value of the evidence. 
Grist, 147 Idaho at 52,205 P.3d at 1188. Here, J.R.'s testimony was not unduly 
prejudicial. Her testimony was brief. It corroborated T.S.'s testimony and only 
addressed those situations when T.S. was also present. Thus, this testimony 
was properly admitted. Truman has failed to show that the district court abused 
its discretion in admitting this evidence. 
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E. The Admission Of The !.R.E. 404(b) Evidence Against Truman Was 
Harmless 
Finally, even if the district court erred in permitting the introduction of 
unidentified !.R.E. 404(b) evidence, such error is harmless. "The inquiry is 
whether, beyond a reasonable doubt, a rational jury would have convicted [the 
defendant] even without the admission of the challenged evidence." State v. 
Johnson, 2010 WL 337993, *4. Again, it is important to note that Truman has 
failed to identify what evidence should have been excluded at trial, thus making it 
more difficult make this determination. While Truman correctly concludes that 
the credibility of the victim was important to the verdict, he fails to articulate how 
the evidence in question would have affected the jury's assessment of that 
credibility. Indeed, if the jury found the victim credible there was little to no risk 
that it convicted Truman merely because he was a man of criminal character. 
Because the evidence in question came primarily or exclusively from the same 
witness, the victim, there was no actual risk that the juri concluded the victim 
was credible merely because Truman was of the character to have done what 
the victim testified he did. 
This situation stands in contrast to State v. Johnson, 2010 WL 337993. In 
Johnson, the case also hinged on the credibility of the victim. Johnson, 2010 WL 
337993, *4. However, in Johnson the 404(b) evidence consisted of a separate 
victim testifying about events that occurred many years earlier. lli In concluding 
that the admission of this evidence was not harmless, the court held, "Evidence 
of prior sexual misconduct with young children is so prejudicial that there is a 
reasonable possibility this error contributed to Johnson's conviction." lli Here, 
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the case also hinged on T.S.'s credibility. However, all of the evidence of prior 
sexual misconduct admitted at trial was misconduct that involved T.S. and to 
which T.S. testified. Either the jury believed her testimony at trial or it didn't. 
There was no testimony concerning prior sexual misconduct with other children. 
Further, the testimony of J.R. only included those incidents that occurred while 
T. S. was present . . For these reasons, even if the district court erred in admission 
of the unknown 404(b) evidence, such admission was harmless. 
III 
Truman Has Failed To Show That The Prosecutor Committed Misconduct When 
The Prosecutor Elicited Testimony Concerning J.R.'s Mental Condition 
A. Introduction 
Truman asserts that the prosecutor erred when he deliberately elicited 
testimony concerning J.R.'s competency and mental condition in contravention of 
the court's order. (Appellant's brief, p. 26.) However, a close review of the order 
and transcript shows that the prosecutor did not elicit testimony in contravention 
of the court's order. Further, even if the testimony was error, Truman has failed 
to show that the error rose to the level of fundamental error. 
B. Standard of Review 
"A conviction will be set aside for prosecutorial misconduct only when the 
conduct is sufficiently egregious to result in fundamental error." State v. Porter, 
130 Idaho 772, 785, 948 P.2d 127, 140 (1997); see also State v. MacDonald, 
131 Idaho 367, 956 P.2d 1314 (Ct. App. 1998). Such error is fundamental only if 
the alleged misconduct is so egregious or inflammatory that any prejudice arising 
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therefrom was not, or could not have been, remedied by a ruling from the trial 
court informing the jury that it should be disregarded. Porter, 130 Idaho at 785-
86, 948 P.2d at 140-41; State v. Smith, 117 Idaho 891, 898, 792 P.2d 916 
(1990); State v. Missamore, 114 Idaho 879, 761 P.2d 1231 (Ct. App. 1988); State 
v. Ames, 109 Idaho 373,707 P.2d 484 (Ct. App. 1985). 
C. Truman Has Failed To Show That The Prosecutor Committed Misconduct 
In His Direct Examination Of Ms. LaFranier 
Prosecutorial misconduct was discussed in State v. Barnes, 147 Idaho 
587,597,212 P.3d 1017, 1027 (Ct. App. 2009) (internal citations omitted): 
When there is no contemporaneous objection, a conviction will be 
reversed for prosecutorial misconduct only if the conduct is 
sufficiently egregious so as to result in fundamental error. 
Prosecutorial misconduct rises to the level of fundamental error 
when it is calculated to inflame the minds of jurors and arouse 
prejudice or passion against the defendant, or is so inflammatory 
that the jurors may be influenced to determine guilt on factors 
outside the evidence. However, even when prosecutorial 
misconduct has resulted in fundamental error, the conviction will 
not be reversed when that error is harmless. The test for whether 
prosecutorial misconduct constituted harmless error is whether the 
appellate court can conclude, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the 
result of the trial would not have been different absent the 
misconduct. 
When a defendant does not object at trial, the inquiry is three-tiered. !ih First, 
the appellate court must determine factually if there was prosecutorial 
misconduct. !ih If there was, then the court must determine whether the 
misconduct rose to the level of fundamental error. !ih Finally, if error was 
fundamental error, the appellate court must consider whether the misconduct 
prejudiced the defendant's right to a fair trial or whether it was harmless. !ih 
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• 
Truman asserts that the prosecutor committed misconduct when he 
elicited testimony regarding J.R.'s mental condition in alleged contravention of 
the court's order. (Appellant's brief, p. 27.) Truman concedes, however, that 
there was no contemporaneous objection at trial to the testimony. (Id.) 
Prior to trial, Truman's attorney filed a motion in limine requesting that the 
state be prevented from eliciting testimony regarding J.R.'s mental capacity 
and/or mental condition during the trial (R., p. 61), which was granted (R., p. 71). 
It is apparent, however, from the pre-trial discussions and from the district court's 
order, discussed infra, that the district court was simply prohibiting the state from 
discussing J.R.'s actual mental disability or her diagnoses, as that would only be 
relevant if Truman was charged with a crime against J.R. based upon whether or 
not she could legally consent to the sexual contact between herself and Truman, 
and not whether J.R. was developmentally delayed. 
At a pre-trial hearing, Truman's attorney explained the issue to the court: 
" just don't want to be in the situation where somebody's talking about 
medical testimony, whether or not she's able - I mean, they can talk about her 
disability, what she suffers from and things like that, but I just don't want to get 
into whether or not she - what age does she operate." (9/2/08 Tr., p. 7, L. 23-
p. 8, L. 4.) 
Six days later, at a motions hearing, the following colloquy conceming the 
motion in limine occurred: 
[THE PROSECUTOR]: The issue Mr. Onanubosi wants to get to 
or seems to be getting at is we can't address that [J.R.] unless we 
have a specific witness testify the foundation that she's mentally 
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handicapped, because it's rape to have sex with a person who is 
mentally deficient, when you know they're mentally deficient. 
However, [J.R.]'s testimony in this case has nothing to do with a 
charge against him. It has to do with the acts that she was 
performing while [T.S.] was there watching and the videotaping. 
And the defendant admits to having intercourse with her, which 
puts [T.S.]- or could put her in the room at the time. That's where 
this is going. 
THE COURT: We haven't gotten to that issue about her 
developmental capacity yet. But how are you going to establish 
that in the trial? 
[THE PROSECUTOR]: 
all. 
Actually, I don't intend to establish it at 
THE COURT: So you don't plan to have any testimony on it? 
[THE PROSECUTOR]: The most I would have is a witness, 
another witness who she was -
THE COURT: Is [J.R.] going to testify? 
[THE PROSECUTOR]: Yes. [J.R.] is going to testify and her 
competency is the same as any other witness on the stand, is 
whether or not she understands the difference between the truth 
and a lie, which is usually presumed for an adult. Children we all 
ask that little series of questions, do you know the difference and 
things like that. 
And two is her ability to perceive and recall the events. I'm going to 
get - grant you that there may take a little more prompting of 
questions, things like that, and that's something we'll have to see 
how she's doing on the stand. 
But that's her competency as a witness, not her competency to 
consent to sex, which isn't an issue in this case at all. The only 
thing I can think of is she used to live in a state school. She now 
lives with - and to calm her down we talk about where she lives 
and who she lives with, and it's pretty clear that she has some 
mental deficiencies. But she did go to Nampa High School to '88 to 
'92. She knows her age. She knows who she lived with, things like 
that, to kind of establish those issues. 
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The most I would probably do is she's bad with dates. The person 
who is her guardian that she lives with would come in to testify 
about - that for a period while she was in college, she would drop 
[JR.] off to be babysat at the defendant's house, and that was from 
August to December of 2006, which then puts this solicitation crime 
into that time frame. 
THE COURT: Okay. So what is your response to Mr. 
Onanubosi's motion in limine regarding - eliciting testimony 
regarding [J.R.]'s mental capacity or mental condition? 
[THE PROSECUTOR]: Other that what I've just told you, I think 
that it. There's no need to qualify an expert or to have an expert 
come in and say that she's got the mind of a 7-to-12-year-old, 
again, because her competency in this case isn't an issue with a 
crime. Her competency is ability to remember or recall events and 
to discern the truth. 
(9/8/08 Tr., p. 42, L. 9 - p. 45, L. 1.) 
After further diSCUssion, the district court ruled: 
[T]he state is not - pursuant to Mr. Onanubosi's motion, the 
state is - and the state's own acknowledgment, the state is not 
going to be allowed to attempt to establish the developmental 
disability of [JR.] in the testimony of the case. 
And I guess the - my point would be before that comes out 
in any way, if you determine that for some reason it's inescapable, 
based on the testimony, you should do an offer outside the 
presence of the jury. If it just can't be addressed, you need to 
make an offer before the judge, who's balancing the 403 factors in 
this case. 
But my understanding is you don't intent to ask any 
questions about that. I think your point is it will be obvious to 
people that -
(9/8/08 Tr., p. 50, L. 14 - p. 51, L. 5.) 
Mr. Bazzoli responded, "It will be. It will be a little difficult, because it's like 
talking to a child .... " (9/8/08 Tr., p. 51, Ls. 6-8.) 
Finally, the written order stated: 
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As to the mental capacity of [J.R.], her mental status is not a 
relevant factor'to the charges in this case as Defendant is not 
charged with any crime at this time for the sexual contact with 
[J.R.]. [J.R.]'s testimony is subject to her competency to testify as a 
witness not upon her mental status as it may relate to other 
possible charges. 
(R., p. 71.) 
Based on the entirety of the foregoing, it is apparent that the district court 
was simply prohibiting the state from discussing J.R.'s actual mental disability or 
her diagnoses to the extent those only would be relevant to whether she could 
legally consent to the sexual contact between herself and Truman. Because 
Truman was not charged with a crime against J.R., a discussion of her 
competency to consent would not be relevant. 
Truman now contends that the testimony of Ms. LaFranier, J.R.'s 
guardian, was in contravention of the court's order. (Appellant's brief, p. 29.) 
Ms. LaFranier testified as follows: 
Q. Liz, what do you do for a living? 
A. I work at the Nampa School District with Special Ed students. 
Q. How long have you done that? 
A. Eleven years. 
Q. Do you know someone by the name of [J.R.]? 
A. Yes, I do. 
Q. How long have you known [J.R.]? 
A. [J.R.] was in my classroom for two years, and she's lived with us for 
seven, so nine years. 
Q. How old is [J.R.]? 
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questions did not discuss J.R.'s actual mental disability or diagnoses, nor did the 
prosecutor attempt to do so. The district court's order simply precluded a 
discussion of J.R.'s mental status as it may have related to any potential crime 
committed by Truman against J.R. (See, R., p. 71.) The district court, however, 
did not exclude testimony concerning J.R.'s ability to testify as a witness. (Id.) 
Here, the prosecutor permissibly questioned J.R.'s guardian in order to establish 
foundation for the guardian's testimony. 
Further, even if the prosecutor elicited testimony from Ms. LaFranier in 
contravention of the court's order, such testimony did not rise to the level of 
fundamental error. Misconduct by a prosecutor is fundamental only if the alleged 
misconduct is so egregious or inflammatory that any prejudice arising from it was 
not, or could not have been, remedied by a ruling from the trial court informing 
the jury that it should be disregarded. State v. Porter, 130 Idaho 772, 785-786, 
948 P.2d 127, 140-141 (1997); State v. Smith, 117 Idaho 891, 898, 792 P.2d 
916,923 (1990); State v. Missamore, 114 Idaho 879, 761 P.2d 1231 (Ct. App. 
1988); State v. Ames, 109 Idaho 373, 707 P.2d 484 (Ct. App. 1985). 
First, because the state's questioning of Ms. LaFranier concerning her 
relationship with J.R. was outside the purview of the district court's order it was 
not error, let alone fundamental error. Apparently neither the district court nor 
Truman's trial counsel, both aware of the court's order, considered the 
questioning improper. Second, even if objectionable, the line of questioning 
could have been cured by a timely objection and, therefore, any error is not 
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fundamental. As Truman concedes, he did not object to this line of questioning. 
(Appellant's brief, p. 27.) 
"An error is harmless if the appellate court is able to say, beyond a 
reasonable doubt, that the jury would. have reached the same result absent the 
error." State v. Lopez, 141 Idaho 575,578,114 P.3d 133, 136 (Ct. App. 2005) 
(citing State v. Boman, 123 Idaho 947,950-51,854 P.2d 290, 293-94 (Ct. App. 
1993)). In light of the evidence presented, even if this Court finds error, any error 
was harmless. J.R.'s mental disability was readily observable to everyone in the 
courtroom. (See generally, Trial Tr., p. 199, L. 11 - p. 214, L. 12, p. 235, L. 6-
p. 244, L. 16.) Although J.R. was 26, both the prosecutor and defense had to 
question her as if she were a much younger child. (ld.) J.R.'s guardian's 
testimony simply gave context to and explained why J.R. was present in 
Truman's home. This Court can conclude, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the 
jury would have reached the same result absent any error. Because Truman has 
failed to establish the prosecutor's questions were improper, or that even if 
improper he was prejudiced by the arguments,he is not entitled to relief. 
IV 
Truman Has Failed To Show That The Cumulative Error Doctrine Applies To This 
Case 
Under the doctrine of cumUlative error, a series of errors, harmless in 
themselves, may in the aggregate show the absence of a fair trial. State v. 
Martinez, 125 Idaho 445, 453,872 P.2d 708, 716 (1994). A necessary predicate 
to application of the doctrine is a finding of more than one error. State v. 
Hawkins, 131 Idaho 396, 958 P.2d 22 (Ct. App. 1998). Truman has failed to 
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show that two or more errors occurred in his trial, and therefore the doctrine is 
inapplicable to this case. See, M.,., LaBelle v. State, 130 Idaho 115, 121,937 
P.2d 427, 433 (Ct. App. 1997). Even if errors in the trial had been shown, they 
would not amount to a denial of due process that would require reversal. State v. 
Gray, 129 Idaho 784, 804, 932 P.2d 907, 927 (Ct. App. 1997); State v. Barcella, 
135 Idaho 191, 204, 16 P.3d 288, 301 (Ct. App. 2000) (accumulation of errors 
deemed harmless). 
CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully concedes that Truman's conviction for sexual abuse 
of a minor be vacated. The state respectfully requests, however, that Truman's 
conviction for lewd conduct be affirmed. 
DATED this 12th day of May 2010. 
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